Abstract
14 This rapid expansion in the overall number of claims can be explained by a combination of factors that relate, firstly, to the institutions which play a leading part in personal injury practice, and secondly, to the individual that makes the claim. The following account does not seek to deal with these factors in detail, but does highlight some of the more recent developments.
Institutional and Personal Factors Encouraging Claims
Our propensity to claim is very much affected by the institutions involved in personal injury practice. For example, the important role of trade unions in encouraging and 13 There were 480,000 whiplash claims in 2012-13 constituting 58% of all motor personal injury claims. However, the increase in motor personal injury claims has also been driven by claims with a description of 'neck or back' injuries. Over the last five years, these claims have almost trebled to around 270,000. Claims which would have previously been labelled as 'whiplash' are now instead being labelled as 'back or neck' injuries. This means that neck injuries which include whiplash account for facilitating claims for work accidents and diseases has long been recognised. 15 The regular referral of trade union assisted claims to particular law firms led to the first specialised personal injury representation for injured claimants. This made a considerable difference to whether a claim was brought and for how much it was settled. Today around 6.5 million employees in the UK are trade union members, constituting 26% of the workforce. 16 They enjoy free access to lawyers to enable them to bring a tort claim. Three other institutions which also affect the propensity to claim are discussed below. These are liability insurers, claims management companies and claimant law firms.
Liability Insurers
In recent years a fact which has always been well known to practitioners has begun to attract more attention from academics: it is increasingly appreciated that insurance companies are fundamental to tort and the operation of the personal injury system.
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They are its "lifeblood." What they do very much affects whether a claim is made, how it is processed and the amount of damages gained. Liability insurance is not merely an ancillary device to protect the insured, but is the "primary medium for the payment of compensation, and tort law [is] a subsidiary part of the process." There are now only half the number of trade union members that there were when membership was at its peak in 1979.
dominate the market so that in motor claims four companies only are responsible for over half the premiums collected. 20 Insurers are the paymasters of the tort system being responsible for 94% of tort compensation for personal injury. 21 They fund not only the damages award itself but also most of the administrative and legal costs of the system. They provide legal representation not only for most defendants but also many claimants. The reason for this lies in the rapid expansion in recent years of before-the-event (BTE) insurance. This form of legal expenses insurance covers almost 3 in 5 adults.
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The influence of insurers inevitably permeates the system. Intuitively it might be expected that, out of self-interest, insurers would act as the system's gatekeepers and policemen. This might involve them discouraging certain claims being made in the first place, carefully examining those that are brought and paying up only when evidence of legal liability is clear. However, the reality has been far from this. In recent years insurers have actually encouraged claims in a number of ways and they have made payments, albeit usually of low amounts, very readily.
An insurer's desire to defend a case has always had to be tempered by cost considerations. A heroic defence denying that a driver has been negligent It has always been the case that an insurer's desire to defend a case has had to be tempered by cost considerations. A heroic defence denying fault in a marginal case may prove not only to be a risky but also a very costly tactic. This is especially the case where the damages claimed are small. Legal costs then can easily exceed the sum being claimed. 23 This danger is present in the majority of cases because the average related practice of insurers was to collect information about allother potential claimants in any accident about which it was informed and again sell those details to law firms. The result was the development of an ultimately flawed business practice:
profit was sought from these individual cases but in doing so a more febrile claims atmosphere resulted; iInsurers in general and society at large eventually suffered.
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Gradually insurers became increasingly concerned about the problems which they had in part created. These included not only the rising number of claims but also the increasing legal costs to which they became subject. Legal aid for personal injury was largely abolished in 2000 and this stimulated the use of conditional fee agreements.
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Under these agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case that they won. They could recover up to double their costs if successful. In seeking to avoid or reduce these costs insurers adopted practices which again in the longer term had the opposite effect of that originally intended. For example, one tactic still used today is "third party capture." This is where the insurer makes a direct approach to any injured party who is not their own insured and does so before they have contacted a lawyer themselves. Insurers seek a quick settlement of the potential claim before any legal costs can be incurred. This has resulted in many people with only very minor injury from the accident in which they were involved (or often no injury at all) being offered sums to settle cases which they had no previous intention of bringing.
Another tactic which also has the unintended effect of encouraging claims has been the making of "pre-med offers." These are offers made to claimants very early in the proceedings, often immediately on receiving notice of a claim, and before any medical report has been obtained. 35 Above n 31.
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certain routine institutional practices of insurers in processing claims have contributed to some of the problems now identified as part of compensation culture.
Claims Management Companies
Claims management companies (CMCs) first emerged about twenty years ago. They made money by trawling for accident victims and seeking quick settlements from which they extracted high fees from claimants. Alternatively, they passed on their clients to solicitors and received a referral fee in return. Today they also offer services such as vehicle repair and credit hire, and some can arrange accident reports and evidence from medical experts. To recruit clients, CMCs have used a variety of tactics from mass media advertising to direct approaches to individuals in the street. 37 Over three-quarters of the population have reported being contacted about making a claim.
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The growth of CMCs was fuelled especially by the removal of legal aid in 2000 which led to the more extensive use of conditional fee agreements. Under these agreements claimant lawyers could secure an increase in their fees in each case that they won. They could recover up to double their costs if successful but nothing at all if they lost. This potential for increased profit added to the incentives to obtain referrals. One problem solicitors faced was that conduct rules prevented them from paying CMCs for these claims. However, these rules were flouted on such a regular basis that the ban on referral payments was eventually lifted in 2004. 39 The development of an efficient, high volume claims department founded upon referrals and advertising proved to be a successful business strategy for a number of law firms.
However, there was growing concern about the abuses that resulted from CMCs being given such a free rein. The press, in particular, used CMC "to describe anything and anyone who is perceived as promoting 'compensation culture,' ripping off consumers, stealing from them and ultimately 'mugging' the most vulnerable in our society." found guilty of helping to arrange 'crash-for-cash' scams and of bribing policemen to steal details of accident victims from a police computer. 41 To combat some of the more extreme practices, the Government began to regulate the operation of CMCs in
2007
. 42 In response to attempts to prevent them making approaches in person, the companies adapted by sending unsolicited text messages and making unsolicited phone calls. 43 Although these practices were later banned, other tactics continued to insurers. 48 These two changes are having a major effect upon the structure of personal injury law firms and the business models they now adopt. It is to these changes that we now turn.
Claimant Personal Injury Law Firms
Initially solicitors' firms were very reluctant to become involved with what was considered the distasteful business of claims gathering. By the late 1990s, however, following the relaxation of the rules on advertising, specialist personal injury firms were actively seeking clients. 49 They still avoided the brash techniques of CMCs but many were prepared to pay referral fees to these companies; many were content to "turn a blind eye" in order to secure a regular flow of work. 
Personal Factors Encouraging Claims
Apart from these institutional influences, there are factors which are personal to the individual claimant which can account for the increase in claims. These are not discussed in detail here partly because the analysis of "naming, blaming and claiming" is well known. 60 That is, the individual first has to recognise that he has suffered an injury; then he needs to attribute responsibility; and only finally does he seek formal recompense for his loss. 61 The increase in claims is the result of a complex mix of changing personal factors which affect all three parts of this analysis.
It is certainly the case that we are less prepared to put up with misfortune than in the past. Today we are more likely to recognise that we have suffered from wrongdoing.
We are better able to identify, for example, the work-related factors that are the cause of our injury or disease, and we are also are more willing to sue our employer, partly because we have much less fear of recrimination. Social norms may even encourage us to seek such compensation as if it were a consumer right. Artful advertising can make lawyers appear not just accessible but even friendly and their hourly charges do not hold the fears they once did. The claim appears risk-free, stress-free and involving merely an administrative process. It is legitimised by the routine, de-personalised and non-adversarial nature of the mass of litigation for minor injury.
When the individual weighs up the pros and cons of claiming a major element will be the risk of incurring legal costs against the level of potential reward. The fear of being out of pocket should the claim fail has been largely removed by the "no-win, no fee" mantra, and is supplemented by the availability of litigation insurance. The possibility of getting nothing from the process seems remote. The utility of claiming therefore seems high. This is accentuated by the increasing levels of damages on offer. This brings us to consider the second part of this article which focuses upon the rising cost of claims.
B. THE RISING COST OF CLAIMS

The Changing Form of Payment: Periodical Payment Orders
A significant cause of the increased cost of claims has been the change made in the way in which damages may now be paid: periodical payments have replaced lump sums in many cases where serious injury is involved. The lump sum system survived almost intact until about twenty five years ago. Damages almost always took the form of one large payment made on a once and for all basis. However, that system imposed upon claimants an enormous responsibility for their future: they had to manage the lump sum in order to ensure that it would continue to meet their needs for the rest of their life. Unfortunately, inflation and the vagaries of the returns upon investment often resulted in the rapid erosion of the compensation. In addition, the damages were bound to be insufficient where losses continued for a longer period of time than that forecast in the settlement or in the court judgement. This frequently happened where the compensation depended upon an assessment of life expectancy for then the money was bound to run out if the claimant lived longer than forecast. Recipients of damages awards thus not only had the risk of investment thrust upon them but also the risk presented by their own mortality. Accident victims who did not die prematurely inevitably found that their compensation eventually would prove too little.
To counter these criticisms the concept of a structured settlement was developed. could be guaranteed to last for their lifetime. In addition, the payments were free of tax and could be protected against inflation in prices. Claimants receiving structured payments were relieved from the stress of having to invest and be responsible for a lump sum far greater than most people encounter in their lifetime. In spite of these benefits, expansion of structured settlements was hindered by a variety of factors, including the refusal of many professionals to give proper consideration to the merits of the alternative form of payment. This was aided by the fact that either of the parties unilaterally could veto any proposed settlement based on periodical payments. The result was that, largely through inertia, the lump sum retained its dominance. 
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The second reason for the increased bill relates to the radical changes made to the way in which periodical payment damages are now assessed. Claimants have been given considerable incentives to choose PPOs over lump sums. The advantages derive from the fact that there is now no need to calculate what lump sum would be required in order to work out the value of the periodical payments to be made. Instead, using a "bottom-up" approach, the court must assess the claimant's needs for the future and then order that periodical payments matching those needs be paid irrespective of their capital cost. These annual payments do not have to be adjusted to take account of speculative estimates of the claimant's life expectancy. Nor do returns have to be forecast of the income that arises upon investment of the damages because the lump sum is simply not there to invest. Instead, the defendant must comply with the order to make the specified regular payments no matter how the market performs and even if the claimant lives longer than forecast. In contrast to the traditional lump sum system, therefore, it is the defendant rather than the claimant who is now exposed to an uncertain financial future by being burdened with the twin risks of investment return and mortality.
This can be explained further by noting that in the calculations needed for a PPO there is no place for the 'Ogden Tables.'  66 That is, multipliers and discount rates are not used: no multiplier is required to reflect the period of years of the loss in order to convert it into an immediate capital amount; and no discount rate is needed to convert the future stream of financial losses into a capital sum representing present day values. As considered under a later heading, the discount rate continues to operate very harshly against claimants if they seek a lump sum. The rate has been set far too high and expects claimants to obtain an unrealistic return on their damages. By contrast, for PPOs defendants cannot take advantage of the artificially high estimate of investment return embedded in the discount rate for lump sums. Instead they can be ordered to provide annual payments irrespective of what this might cost as an equivalent capital sum. Furthermore, the order extends for an uncertain period -the rest of the claimant's life. The risks that arise which relate to both the investment return and the longevity of the claimant are thus entirely transferred to the defendant and this carries with it a substantial additional cost.
The final advantage of a PPO over a lump sum is that, following a key appellate decision, periodical payments can now be inflation proofed by being tied not just to the future rise in prices but to the rise in earnings. 67 This is of considerable importance in ensuring that a claimant's care costs will continue to be met. This is because, in general, the wages of carers over time will significantly exceed price inflation and will considerably increase the bill for future care. As a result of the case which allowed for this wage inflation the number of cases involving PPOs has increased substantially. The additional care costs which defendants must now bear, together with those costs arising from the new investment and mortality risks described above, account for the considerable rise in the true value of damages in these serious injury cases.
Recovery of State Benefits from Damages
Since 1990 defendants and their insurers have had to pay more for claims because they have had to reimburse the state for certain benefits received by the claimant as a result of the injury suffered. 68 The state has been able to recover some of the cost of its social security expenditure and health care costs: public finances have thus been
replenished. There are limits on the amounts that can be recovered. For example, money can only be sought for benefits received up to the date that a case settles; social security and NHS treatment provided later are at public expense. Another limit is that there is a maximum sum payable for health treatment. However, over the years the recovery scheme has proven effective in clawing back increasing amounts of money, especially following the inclusion of health service charges in 1999. By the new millennium the amount of social security recovered had risen steadily and had reached £201 million a year. Since then, caused partly by a marked decline in work accidents, the amounts recovered have fallen by a third so that in 2013-14 only £134 million was recouped. 69 To this must also be added the health service charges recovered for that year of £223 million so that in total £357 million was repaid to the public purse. Unlike social security, these health service costs have increased year on year and now constitute the more important source of revenue. However, they represent but a tiny fraction of the actual expenditure on the NHS.
The recovery scheme has clearly increased the cost of claims, added to the premiums charged by insurers and thus contributed to one of the concerns about compensation culture. However, its effect upon the number of claims brought varies. Because the NHS is freely available, claimants are not directly affected by charges made to compensators for health costs. By contrast, the recovery of social security benefit has affected them. This is because the scheme enables compensators to reduce the damages that claimants can obtain from them by the amount of social security benefit that has to be repaid to the state. Damages have thus been reduced and, as a consequence, the incentive to claim.
However, the incentive was restored somewhat when the scheme was changed to exempt the claimant from any reduction in that part of the damages award which is paid for non-pecuniary loss. This means that no reduction in damages is to be made, even if a claimant receives benefits, provided that no financial loss has been suffered because, for example, earnings have been unaffected and there has been no need to pay for treatment or care. The compensation then is for pain and suffering alone and there can be no reduction. This is so even though the compensator remains liable to repay the social security benefits the claimant has received. In effect, such claimants have the whip hand in negotiations and can force advantageous settlements. They can emphasise that the longer the claim remains unpaid the larger will be the bill for benefits even though this will not reduce the amount of damages to be paid. The result is that insurers are encouraged settle certain claims promptly and at the higher end of the potential scale of payment. Predominantly these claims involve minor injury such as whiplash where it is often the case that the only compensation to be awarded is for pain and suffering. The recovery of benefits scheme can thus affect aspects of compensation culture.
Non-Pecuniary Loss and Increasing the Price of Pain
In practice, it is the compensation paid for pain and suffering that often provides the financial incentive to claim. In many cases it is the only head of personal injury damage that is sought. In recent years this compensation has increased significantly.
There are a number of reasons for this, the most important being the changes made as a result of the test case of Heil v Rankin. 70 The judges in that case took the opportunity to raise awards for pain, suffering and loss of amenity in two ways:
firstly, they increased payments for more serious injuries by up to a third; and secondly, they tied all awards in future to the rise in the Retail Prices Index. This second measure has accounted for a further rise in damages of about quarter since the test case was decided. Irrespective of whether the policy reasons given in the case justified these increases, 71 it is clear that damages for non-pecuniary loss have risen substantially as a result. For example, at the top end of the scale, damages for severe brain damage or tetraplegia have increased from £150,000 at the turn of the century to about £330,000 today.
Damages have also risen as a result of the introduction and extensive use of the Judicial College's Guidelines for the Assessment of Damages in Personal Injury
Cases. This is a book to be "packed in every judge's lunch bag" 72 for it provides the parameters within which awards for pain and suffering are to be assessed. It is a two way process in as much as it informally guides courts but also tries to reflect their most recent decisions on quantum. First issued in 1991, it has been revised almost every two years and is now in its twelfth edition. It has become increasingly detailed.
The booklet has been very helpful to practitioners and has removed some of the uncertainty that traditionally clouds the negotiation process. However, there can still be major disputes on the facts of cases, for example, in deciding which of the nine specified levels of neck injury the claimant has actually suffered. Subject to notable exceptions the regular revision of the booklet has generally resulted in a real increase in the scale of awards for particular injuries. In addition, the inflation update has ensured that practitioners have recent figures ready to hand which was not always the case in the past. On the whole, claimants have benefitted. To counteract this, insurers now want practitioners to be forced to assess pain and suffering by using computer software which values claims by incorporating information about the mass of settled claims instead of only the few that are adjudicated in court.
political lobbying by insurers in recent years, the prospect of displacing the Judicial
Guidelines with a calibration tool that insurers have devised seems very remote.
A final cause of increasing damages in this area relates to the changes in funding introduced as a result of Jackson reforms. 74 Claimants have been compensated for no longer being able to recover from defendants two items of expenditure: first, the success fee charged by their solicitor; and second, the premium that was paid for after the event insurance which was bought to protect against the risk of costs should the case be lost. In return for claimants bearing these extra pecuniary costs themselves, their damages for non-pecuniary loss have been increased by ten per cent. 75 On the surface this seems an odd method of compensation for it substitutes apples for the loss of pears: that is, it increases the pain and suffering award when it is a financial loss that has been suffered. Even though the rough justice involved in devising this equivalent has some empirical support, it emphasises the peculiar prominence that pain and suffering now occupies within the tort system.
Let us take this point further. The overall increase in this head of claim is especially significant because the largest component of damages for personal injury is the payment made for pain and suffering: two thirds of the total damages awarded by the system are for non-pecuniary loss. 76 The reason for this dominance lies in the fact that financial loss from their bodily injury. They make a full recovery and have no continuing ill effects. The typical injury involves a whiplash, these constituting almost half the claims in the system. Apart from recovering the cost of damage to the vehicle, the claim is usually only brought to recover the compensation for pain and suffering.
In many cases, therefore, non-pecuniary loss provides the only incentive to sue for personal injury. It is the engine that drives the tort system. By contrast, it also accounts for much of the disproportionate cost of the litigation system and it provides opportunities for exaggeration of losses and fraudulent claims. As such, it is the root cause of many of the concerns about compensation culture.
Pecuniary Loss, Discount Rates and the Real Financial World
The final reason accounting for a rise in the level of damages is that the tort award is wedded to the principle of returning the claimant to the position enjoyed before the injury took place insofar as it is possible to do so. can have a considerable effect in certain serious injury cases. Advances in medicine and support services have been such that paraplegics, for example, can today generally expect only a small reduction in their life expectancy. As a result, lifetime awards of damages have had to be increased to continue to allow for such matters as the length of time that future care will be needed.
A second change made to the tables relates to the allowance made for the prospective potential earning capacity of a disabled claimant. Research has demonstrated that people with disabilities spend more time out of employment than previously thought. 84 As a result a higher discount is now applied to increase their damages so as to account for their particular difficulties in the labour market. Acceptance of the value of such economic and social science data has been an important factor in raising damages awards.
In spite of the increase in damages which has taken place this century, it remains the case that claimants are very unlikely to receive 'full' compensation; they are not returned to the position they were in before the accident. The experience of past decades has proven that, for those who need long term care and support, the lump sum will prove insufficient. Few claimants injured in their youth have any compensation left when they enter old age today. There are several reasons for this but perhaps the most important is that too much allowance has been made for the potential return which can be obtained by a claimant by investing the damages. A discount rate is used to allow for the fact that the claimant receives compensation earlier than he would have had done so, for example, if he had been required to work for the wages now lost. The discount recognises that investment income can be obtained from this accelerated receipt of money. However, the rate used to calculate the damages has consistently been wrongly set; the figure has never reflected the true investment return that the claimant can actually achieve. 2004) para 15 noted that the set discount rate had never been within 0.5% of the correct rate of return.
For thirty years, until 1998, the discount rate was fixed at 4.5% in spite of a myriad of changes which took place in the financial world during that time. No matter when claimants invested, it was nearly always impossible to obtain the set return. Net interest and capital gain fell well short of what was required and this led to rapid depletion of the long-term value of the compensation. Today the legal system expects a claimant to achieve a real rate of return above inflation and after taxation of 2.5%.
With inflation at 2% and taxation costs at a further 1%, in effect the claimant must obtain a return of 5.5% at a time when the best secure savings rate is far below that figure. It is inevitable that any lump sum awarded will be eroded much more quickly than the court presumes.
The present discount rate was set by the Lord Chancellor in 2001 and was based on the return on index linked government stocks (ILGS). Since then there has been a severe decline in the return from these gilt investments. Despite this, the 2.5% discount rate has remained unchanged and has become increasingly anachronistic.
The real rate of return after inflation is traced in the below table. Even making no allowance for liability to tax, the returns have been far below 2.5%.  Applying the old 4.5% rate the multiplier for the annual loss would be 18.4;
 for the present 2.5% rate it is 24.85, an increase in damages of 35%;
The resulting substantial under-compensation is illustrated in the introduction to R.  and if the discount rate is reduced to nil so as to reflect the real investment return today on ILGS the multiplier is 38.85, an increase in damages of 111% since the 4.5% rate was last used in 1998.
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For many years claimant lawyers lobbied for the discount rate to be revised but they had little success. However, in 2012 the Ministry of Justice issued a consultation paper asking how the rate should be set. 87 Insurers were particularly alarmed by the prospect of a change in the discount rate and emphasised that in practice claimants did not actually invest in ILGS. After effective lobbying, the Ministry were persuaded that further investigation was required and a second consultation paper was issued dealing with the legal framework. 88 Although this may have the effect of limiting any downward pressure upon the discount rate, it is the change threatened in this area that could potentially have the greatest effect on defendants and the overall cost of the tort system. The Ministry at present is sitting on its hands and, as yet, has not responded to the consultation and evidence obtained.
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CONCLUSION
In reviewing compensation culture this article has focused upon the number of claims and the cost of claims. Although motor claims have doubled this century, largely because of institutional factors and a "dysfunctional insurance market", other claims have remained relatively stable. By contrast the cost of claims has continued to increase, albeit for reasons which many supporters of the tort system would support.
86 Simon v Helmot [2012] UKPC 5 dramatically illustrates the potential effect of lowering the discount rate. It concerned the long term care of a young victim of a Guernsey road accident. Because of the jurisdiction, the court was not bound by the specified 2.5% discount rate and instead based the decision upon common law principles. As a result the total award was almost £14 million and the difference between the cost of future care using a 2.5 per cent discount rate and the minus1. 
